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TEACHING A NEW DOG OLD TRICKS: WHY THE HOWEY TEST IS
STILL THE SEC’S BEST FRIEND WHEN EXAMINING INITIAL COIN
OFFERINGS
Laura Gritz*
This Recent Development examines the state of the law and
opinions surrounding whether an initial coin offering (ICO)
constitutes an offering of securities under federal securities laws.
The SEC has taken the position that each offering will be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis, looking at the facts and circumstances of
each offering. The number of ICOs has been expanding at an
exponential pace, leaving regulators scrambling to decide whether
these tokens are within the jurisdiction of a specific regulator, such
as the SEC if they are securities, and how to apply existing law to
this new market. If the ICO token is a security, it must comply with
the applicable securities laws. If the SEC determines that the token
is not a security, the company does not need to register the ICO
under those securities laws. Both the issuers and the regulators need
to understand what is expected of each other in order to create an
environment that does not stifle innovation, while sufficiently
protecting investors.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Initial coin offerings” (ICOs) are becoming an increasingly
popular form of raising capital for up-and-coming and established
companies alike.1 A seemingly related variant of an initial public
offering (IPO),2 ICOs present a similar opportunity for investors to
cash in on a new type of asset.3 In exchange for an initial investment,
both private and public investors are hoping to catch the start of the
next wave of innovation.4 Contributing to this craze is the
skyrocketing price of digital currencies such as Bitcoin, which fuel
the idea that ICOs and coin offerings might parallel the dot-com
boom.5
Unlike an established company going public through an IPO,
these companies are gathering contributions in the initial stages of
*

J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2019. The author
would like to thank Professor Thomas Lee Hazen for his insightful views and
suggestions on this developing topic, Christian Ferlan, Joseph Hjelt, Jordan
Luebkemann, Erin Larson, and the rest of the Journal of Law and Technology
staff for their incredibly helpful edits and feedback.
1
Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July
25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings
[hereinafter Initial Coin Offerings].
2
See generally Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ipo-investorbulletin.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2018) (giving an overview of considerations and information to
help in IPO investing).
3
See, e.g., Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin
Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov
/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (“The world’s social
media platforms and financial markets are abuzz about cryptocurrencies and
‘initial coin offerings’ (ICOs). There are tales of fortunes made and dreamed to
be made.”); Trevor N. Cadigan et al., This Is What You Get When You Invest in
an
Initial
Coin
Offering,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Nov.
9,
2017),
http://www.businessinsider.com/ico-initial-coin-offering-explained-bitcoinethereum-2017-11; Denis Baranov, The New Blockchain Trend that Could
Transform Business, FORTUNE (Oct. 18, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/18
/ico-cryptocurrency-coin-market-blockchain/.
4
See Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1; Clayton, supra note 3.
5
See Izabella Kaminska, The Digital Currency Boom Echoes Dotcom Fever,
FINANCIAL T IMES (Sept. 8, 2017).

APR. 2018]

Teaching a New Dog Old Tricks

195

development and using the funds to create products.6 In contrast to
an IPO, where purchasing stock represents ownership in the
company, investors in an ICO receive digital tokens created and
issued by that company that may not represent an ownership
interest.7 “Promoters may tell purchasers that the capital raised from
the sales will be used to fund development of a digital platform,
software, or other projects and that the virtual tokens or coins may
be used to access the platform, use the software, or otherwise
participate in the project.”8 Currently, these offerings are largely
unregulated, though their popularity is attracting the attention of the
SEC and other federal regulators.9 This rising concern for investors
is leading to increased scrutiny of ICOs. Investors and regulators
alike seek to ensure that companies issuing tokens deemed to be
securities are either registered under the securities laws or estopped
from continuing their unauthorized “fundraising.”10
These coins can represent and accomplish a wide variety of
products and functions. On one end of the spectrum, coins may be
offered and purchased as an investment with the intent to make a
profit.11 Other investors purchase coins with the intent to use them
for the purpose for which they were developed.12 For example,
consider a token that allows the investor access to a specific
decentralized cloud storage program.13 Another ICO example is the
creation of an app and token to allow users to interact in order to
offset one user’s carbon emissions against the reduction in
6

Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1.
Id.
8
Id.
9
See, e.g., id.; Clayton, supra note 3 (“I have asked the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement to continue to police this area vigorously and recommend
enforcement actions against those that conduct initial coin offerings in violation
of the federal securities laws.”).
10
See Clayton, supra note 3.
11
JUAN BATIZ-BENET, JESSE CLAYBURGH & MARCO SANTORI, THE SAFT
PROJECT: TOWARD A COMPLIANT TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK 9 (2017),
https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-Whitepaper.pdf.
12
Id.
13
Josiah Wilmoth, ICO 101: Utility Tokens vs. Security Tokens, STRATEGIC
COIN, http://strategiccoin.com/ico-101-utility-tokens-vs-security-tokens/ (last
visited Mar. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Wilmoth, ICO 101].
7
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another’s.14 Ultimately, the investor’s intentions and planned uses
affect regulators’ legal characterization of the coin.15
Much of the debate stems from attempts to characterize coins
specifically with respect to whether the coins qualify as securities.16
Absent any objective bright-line test to guarantee the status of these
coins under securities laws, many developers are running into
difficulties provoked by this uncertainty.17 Even if the issuers decide
that their offering is likely to become a security at a certain point,
they may not know exactly when.18 ICOs usually occur during early
stages of a company’s development,19 and there is some debate as to
whether the stage of development that the product is in can affect
whether the federal securities laws will apply.20 If securities laws do
apply, there are corresponding registration requirements that will
increase time and costs.21 This is a result that the issuers would like
to avoid; however, the disclosures would increase oversight and
transparency for investors.22 The SEC has expressly avoided any
14
Frequently Asked Questions, LIVING OFFSET, https://www.livingoffset.io
/faqs/index.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
15
See generally Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207,
117 SEC Docket No. 5, at 10–15 (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation
/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter The DAO] (explaining how the
categorization of the type of token is based on different factors depending on the
facts and circumstances of each case).
16
See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 3.
17
CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 1, NOT SO FAST –
RISKS RELATED TO THE USE OF A “SAFT” FOR TOKEN SALES 3–4 (2017),
https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/Cardozo%20Blockchain%20Project%2
0-%20Not%20So%20Fast%20-%20SAFT%20Response_final.pdf [hereinafter
CARDOZO].
18
See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 11, at 1516 (explaining how the authors
believe that there is a strong likelihood that even if the token is a security before
it becomes functional, once it becomes functional it no longer implicates
securities laws).
19
See id. at 1.
20
Id.
21
See Fast Answers: Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html
(last modified Sept. 2, 2011) (providing a broad overview of the registration
requirements).
22
See id.
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definitive conclusions as to what types of ICOs fall within the
definition of a security, explaining that it depends on the facts and
circumstances of each case, likely due to the varying nature of each
token.23
To determine how the law may allow room for a token as a
security, it is useful to first examine how the definition of a security
may be applied to encompass ICOs. Within the definition of a
security, among the enumerated list of items such as stocks, notes,
and bonds, is the term “investment contract.”24 In SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co., the Supreme Court created the predominant test to
determine whether a particular product or issuance falls within the
“investment contract” enumeration, and is thus a security.25 The
court defined the test of an investment contract as “whether the
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”26 The SEC
currently applies the Howey test to evaluate ICOs against which it
has brought enforcement actions.27
The Howey framework is the most suitable test for the SEC to
apply in determining whether the ICO at issue is a security.
Although one of the predominant concerns of relying on this test is
that it does not create clear boundaries for the developers, case law
and SEC guidance will begin to form those lines over time.28 This
subjective test is still the best option for maintaining enough
flexibility to examine each unique token individually and on its own
merits. It is important for the SEC to evaluate each offering on a
case-by-case basis, as opposed to the comfort of a more objective
and rigid rule with a clear, but in some cases inaccurate, application.
Applying this test, it is likely that the SEC will find the majority of

23

The DAO, supra note 15, at 1718; Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1.
Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
25
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946).
26
Id. at 301.
27
Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, 118 SEC Docket No. 5, at
2 (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf.
28
See The DAO, supra note 15, at 12 (explaining that the report was issued in
the public interest to advise those who may use similar means of capital raising as
to how to best ensure compliance with the securities laws).
24
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the ICO tokens to be securities.29 Another factor for the SEC to
weigh in its determination is the likelihood that the investor’s initial
contribution will result in an ultimate loss due to the failure of the
product.30 This consideration is called the risk capital test31 and will
be discussed alongside the Howey test.32
Part II of this Recent Development discusses the two primary
types of coins to clarify what the deciding factors may be in
determining whether a particular offering needs to be registered
under the securities laws. Part III works through some key points
defining what constitutes a security, considers why tokens are likely
securities under the definition, and discusses some of the arguments
taking the stance that a token is not a security. Part IV discusses why
the subjective Howey33 test is still the best tool that the SEC has to
analyze these ICOs. This will allow the SEC to look past the issuer’s
surface label of the offering to determine whether they will be
required to comply with federal securities laws.
II. TYPES OF COINS
There are two primary types of coins with two different
functions.34 Utility coins, as the name indicates, are meant to
function for a specific purpose.35 Most coins offered in an ICO are
29

Daniel C. Zinman, James Q. Walker, Margaret Winterkorn Meyers
& Whitney O’Byrne, SEC Issues Warning to Lawyers on ICOs, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.bna.com/sec-issues-warning-n57982089230/.
30
See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815 (1961).
31
Id.
32
In light of the complexity of this rapidly developing field, and in order to
facilitate this work’s analysis, this Recent Development will largely generalize
characteristics of tokens. As such, the conclusions drawn are not intended to be allencompassing, with respect to the hundreds of different types of coins and their
purposes. Olga Kharif, Initial Coin Offerings on Record Pace Even with
Crackdown, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2017-12-11/initial-coin-offerings-on-record-pace-even-with-u-scrackdown; ICO Calendar, HYPE.CODES, https://hype.codes/ico-calendar (last
visited Feb. 22, 2018). Rather, the discussions in this Recent Development consider
that there are likely to be exceptions, and most statements will not apply fully to
each token.
33
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
34
BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 11, at 34.
35
Id.
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purportedly utility coins as they have a specific use in mind outside
of investment and offer no ownership rights in the company itself.36
The other, less common, type of coin is security coins. Security
coins are similar to stock in that they are purchased for investment
and represent an interest in the company.37 As has been common in
this blossoming area, cryptocurrencies are subject to some
definitional overlap. There is some indirect debate about whether
cryptocurrencies,38 such as Bitcoin, which function as a medium of
exchange and payment, are a type of utility token or if they exist as
their own category.39 There is extensive literature on these virtual
36

Id. at 1.
Josiah Wilmoth, The Difference Between Utility Tokens and Equity Tokens,
STRATEGIC COIN,
http://strategiccoin.com/difference-utility-tokens-equitytokens/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Wilmoth, Difference Between].
38
The Financial Action Task Force defines “cryptocurrency” as:
37

a math-based, decentralised convertible virtual currency that is protected
by cryptography.—i.e., it incorporates principles of cryptography to
implement a distributed, decentralised, secure information economy.
Cryptocurrency relies on public and private keys to transfer value from
one person (individual or entity) to another, and must be
cryptographically signed each time it is transferred. The safety, integrity
and balance of cryptocurrency ledgers is ensured by a network of
mutually distrustful parties (in Bitcoin, referred to as miners) who
protect the network in exchange for the opportunity to obtain a randomly
distributed fee (in Bitcoin, a small number of newly created bitcoins,
called the “block reward” and in some cases, also transaction fees paid
by users as a incentive for miners to include their transactions in the next
block). Hundreds of cryptocurrency specifications have been defined,
mostly derived from Bitcoin, which uses a proof of-work system to
validate transactions and maintain the block chain.
FATF REPORT, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL
AML/CFT RISKS, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE 4 (June 2014),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-keydefinitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf.
39
Compare BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 11, at 3, 9, with GUIDELINES FOR
ENQUIRIES REGARDING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INITIAL COIN
OFFERINGS (ICOS), SWISS FINANCIAL MARKET SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY 3 (Feb.
16, 2018) [hereinafter FINMA] (naming a list of three categories: Payment
Tokens (synonymous with cryptocurrencies), Utility Tokens, Asset Tokens), and
Matthew May, What to Consider in an ICO, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/11/21/what-to-
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currencies,40 and though they offer relevant and useful discussions,
they are outside of the scope and have no bearing on the conclusions
of this Recent Development.
A. Utility Coins
Utility coins are tokens purchased by investors for future use of
an ecosystem or network of users being created by the developers.41
For example, investors may purchase a token that will allow them
to have access to a certain application, and thus the value of the coin
comes from the ability to partake in its use.42 These uses can range
from a social-media type of user integration43 to a more sophisticated
platform that allows or requires users with the appropriate
knowledge base to contribute to the underlying technology.44 Utility
tokens, unlike stock, often do not convey ownership rights in the
underlying enterprise upon purchase.45 As the Cardozo Blockchain
Project explains:
[t]he contours between investment and utility tokens are not well-defined
at this point, but utility tokens are generally designed to offer a
consumptive or functional utility, as opposed to an inherent opportunity
for profit. Many utility tokens are integral to the functioning of a
blockchain-based platform that creates a decentralized network and can
represent, for example, membership or licensing rights, staking
mechanisms, or incentivization systems. 46

As an illustration of a utility token, a public statement by the
SEC uses an example of a token to participate in a book of the month
consider-in-an-ico/#3bba95de5c44 (distinguishing between coin and token, with
both being cryptocurrencies but the coin being similar to cash as it is spent and
token being used for a “utility in a specific blockchain platform”).
40
See, e.g., Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs
of Future Public Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493 (2016).
41
BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 11, at 34.
42
Wilmoth, Difference Between, supra note 37.
43
See Munchee Inc., supra note 27 at 12 (explaining how the app was
designed to allow users to post restaurant reviews and photos).
44
See Tezos Contribution Terms, TEZOS 2, https://www.tezos.ch/pages
/contribution-terms.html#contribution-terms (last visited Jan. 29, 2018)
(requiring that the investor understand the intricacies of the blockchain system
and plans to use the investment to participate in the network).
45
Wilmoth, Difference Between, supra note 37.
46
CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 2.
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club.47 It concludes that a “token that represents a participation
interest in a book-of-the-month club may not implicate our
securities laws, and may well be an efficient way for the club’s
operators to fund the future acquisition of books and facilitate the
distribution of those books to token holders.”48 This example is
followed by the conclusion that even though simple participation
tracking and integration may be an acceptable use, ICOs have taken
this example to the next level by creating an entire functional
network with an investment in a “yet-to-be-built publishing house
with the authors, books and distribution networks all to come.”49 The
example is meant to highlight how many of these tokens are being
created for use in a detailed network beyond a basic, single-use
transaction.
B. Security Coins
Security, or equity coins, are those at the other end of the
spectrum, and their issuance serves a function similar to the issuance
of stock.50 There may be ownership rights in a future system, and the
incentive to invest will have been driven by the expectation of
profit.51 Strategic Coin describes equity tokens as:
a subcategory of security tokens that represent ownership of an asset,
such as debt or company stock. By employing blockchain technology
and smart contracts, a startup could forgo a traditional initial public
offering (IPO) and instead issue shares and voting rights over the
blockchain. Additionally, a lender could create tokens that represent debt
owned by the company, enabling loans to be bought and sold in a highliquidity environment.52

One of the first ICOs that the SEC investigated was The DAO,
an organization that issued DAO Tokens which were ultimately held
to be securities.53 This security token has characteristics of stock and
represents an interest in a company.54 The investors contributed
47

Clayton, supra note 3.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Wilmoth, Difference Between, supra note 37.
51
See id.
52
Id.
53
The DAO, supra note 15, at 1.
54
Id. at 56.
48
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funds in exchange for this new token.55 The DAO planned to use the
funds to invest in different projects, and profits were to be returned
to the investors in a form comparable to dividends.56 According to
the SEC investigation report, the token offered the holder ownership
and voting rights, and the promotional materials claimed that the
owners would receive a return on their investment in the form of
“rewards.”57 There was also a functioning and efficient secondary
marketplace on which to trade these tokens.58 These stock-like
characteristics led the SEC to classify DAO tokens as securities and
issue an investigative report explaining their reasoning for doing
so.59
Security coins primarily fall within the scope of the securities
classification, as it seems they are simply stocks or other investment
tools in a different form.60 The tokens with these straightforward
properties will not be analyzed further in this Recent Development.
Instead, the tokens with characteristics comprising both security
coins and utility coins will be discussed. For example, utility coins
may exhibit characteristics of a security when people invest in utility
coins not for their use as a currency, but rather in the hope that the
success of the created product will allow them to trade the token for
a profit.61 These utility tokens with features of a security will be the
focus of this Recent Development because these are the flexible and
sometimes ambiguous characteristics that the majority of tokens will
have.62

55

Id.
Id. at 4–6.
57
Id. at 5–6.
58
Id. at 6.
59
Id. at 1.
60
Wilmoth, ICO 101, supra note 13.
61
See generally MUNCHEE INC., supra note 27, at 78 (explaining that the
circumstances leading an investor to expect a profit from a token with utility
contributed to the classification of the token as a security).
62
CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 2. The results of a study examining the rights
that different utility tokens represent resulted in a finding that the majority offer
access to an online platform. Id. The security features of these utility tokens will
be discussed throughout this Recent Development, primarily concerning how they
meet the Howey test factors.
56
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III. WHY MOST UTILITY TOKENS ARE ALSO SECURITIES
A digital token is not among the listed items in the definition of
a security.63 Therefore, it would need to fall within the enumerated
term “investment contract” to be considered a security.64 To
determine whether an investment contract exists, the favored
analysis is the Howey test.65 This test determines that an offering is
an investment contract if there is (i) an investment of money, (ii) in
a common enterprise, (iii) with an expectation of profits, (iv) solely
from the efforts of others.66
The ICOs discussed below all involve a capital contribution by
investors.67 Therefore the first Howey factor is satisfied. The ICOs
will also be part of a common enterprise with multiple investors
contributing capital to the development of the product; thus the
second factor is also satisfied.68 The third factor, whether there is an
expectation of profits, is discussed first. Finally, the factor as to
whether the expected profits come from the efforts of others will be
addressed. After the factors in Howey are analyzed, the risk capital
test is looked at as another useful consideration when weighing
whether the token is an “investment contract” and thus a security.
A. Expectation of Profits
The Howey test looks at the intent of the investor to consider
whether an individual investor or group of individuals likely had an

63

Securities Act, Section 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018).
Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (creating a test to
establish if an instrument is an “investment contract”).
65
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99 (holding that “an investment contract for
purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the
shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal
interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.”).
66
See id.
67
Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1 (explaining how investors purchase the
tokens during the ICO).
68
Id.
64
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expectation of profit in the ICO.69 Often, the sophistication and
knowledge of the investor is a strong factor in weighing his or her
intent.70 The analysis considers both the groups of potential investors
that the developers are targeting and the ultimate investor in the
initial offering.71 For example, if the product is a new blockchain
ecosystem designed to help facilitate transactions, avoiding the
issues that plague many of the current systems, investors in the
product should be tech savvy and have a demonstrated interest in
using the product itself.72 When applying the Howey test to a product
that is technical in nature, such as this system, there is likely an
inference that individuals with no knowledge of the practical
application of the technology will be investing primarily for profit.73
The test also accounts for the actions of the company issuing the
tokens.74 If the issuer or issuing company targets investors with little
to no background or experience in that specific product, it follows
that the issuers assumed that those investors would invest with the
expectation of profit instead of planning on using the product
themselves.75 Developers touting high returns is an equally clear
sign investors may become involved principally for that purpose,

69

Munchee Inc., supra note 27, at 4, 67 (discussing how the investors could
expect the value of the token to increase due both to their actions in participating
in the ecosystem and the actions the company planned to take).
70
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300.
71
See Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 988 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
timeshare interest led to an expectation of profit from investors when the shares
were advertised in a way to lead to that expectation).
72
See TEZOS, supra note 44, at 23 (requiring that the investor understand the
intricacies of the blockchain system and plans to use the investment to participate
in the network).
73
See Howey at 299–300.
74
See Munchee Inc., supra note 27, at 56.
75
See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300 (“They are offering an opportunity to
contribute money and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise
managed and partly owned by respondents. They are offering this opportunity to
persons who reside in distant localities and who lack the equipment and
experience requisite to the cultivation, harvesting and marketing of the citrus
products. Such persons have no desire to occupy the land or to develop it
themselves; they are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their
investment.”).
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which will satisfy the third factor.76 If the other Howey conditions
are also satisfied, the ICO is a security, and the issuers are required
to register under federal securities laws.77
The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA),
like many other regulators around the world, has been concerned
with how best to approach ICOs.78 FINMA released guidelines in
February 2018 that provided a framework for determining whether
an ICO token would be considered a security.79 It took an approach
that was similar to the expectation of profit prong in the Howey test,
deciding that:
[u]tility tokens will not be treated as securities if their sole purpose is to
confer digital access rights to an application or service and if the utility
token can actually be used in this way at the point of issue. In these cases,
the underlying function is to grant the access rights and the connection
with capital markets, which is a typical feature of securities, is missing.
If a utility token additionally or only has an investment purpose at the
point of issue, FINMA will treat such tokens as securities (i.e. in the same
way as asset tokens).80

These guidelines acknowledge that using a utility coin only for
its purpose does not implicate securities laws.81 The concern is that
there are virtually no situations, at least from what the SEC has seen,
where utility coins have been restricted in use to the extent necessary
to meet this requirement.82 FINMA’s statement—that if there is an
additional investment purpose at the time of issue, the token will be
treated as a security83—encompasses the majority of these tokens. It
is difficult to state that everyone who invested in an ICO solely had
an expectation of use, with no investment agenda whatsoever. If
76

See Teague, 35 F.3d at 989 (holding that a timeshare interest led to an
expectation of profit from investors when the shares were advertised in a way to
lead to that expectation).
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., FINMA, supra note 39; Annaliese Milano, German Regulator
Pledges ‘Precise’ Oversight of ICOs, COINDESK (Feb. 22, 2018),
https://www.coindesk.com/german-regulator-pledges-precise-oversight-icos/.
79
FINMA, supra note 39.
80
Id. at 5.
81
Id.
82
Zinman, supra note 29. The SEC chairman has noted that he has yet to see
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read literally, a single purchaser who may have an inkling of an
investment goal in the ICO, even if it is not the predominant factor,
will cause the token to be treated as a security.84 From the statements
seen thus far, this conclusion is consistent with the SEC’s findings.85
The investment intent is taken into account in the expectation of
profits prong of the Howey test and is now further established
through a regulator’s official acknowledgement.86 These FINMA
guidelines addressing ICOs may provide useful guidance to the SEC
when the agency is creating appropriate regulations.
1. Scarcity of the Product
A consideration that has only garnered limited discussion is how
the scarcity of the ultimate product affects the expectation of profit
factor in the Howey analysis.87 For example, some commentators say
that one of the draws of investors and speculators to Bitcoin is the
fact that there is a limited quantity that will be issued.88 If there was
an unlimited supply of Bitcoin, it is possible that the price would not
be as inflated as it currently is.89 Supply and demand are likely
playing a factor in that value, among other market forces. 90 If the
issuers of the ICO are aware of this fact, they could decide to
artificially limit access to the product that the tokens represent in
order to increase the price people are willing to pay for the token in
84
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See generally Munchee Inc., supra note 27 (explaining how the investors’
expectations of profits played a factor in the classification of the token as a
security).
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FINMA, supra note 39, at 5.
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See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 717 (2005).
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Id. (explaining how the issuers and initial investors of an IPO could
manipulate the price of stocks upward through limiting the supply and increasing
the desire to purchase); R.A., New Money, ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/03/bitcoin.
89
R.A., supra note 88. The rapid price fluctuations of Bitcoin lend themselves
to a conclusion that the prices are inflated at times, with a price of $4,358 on
October 1, 2017, an increase to $19,458 on December 17, 2017, and then another
rapid decrease to $6,653 on February 5, 2018. Bitcoin Charts, WORLDCOININDEX,
https://www.worldcoinindex.com/coin/bitcoin (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). That
sharp fall was followed by another increase to $11,679 on February 20, 2018. Id.
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the secondary market.91 This limitation may be necessary if the
ultimate product, drawing on the example of the blockchain
ecosystem above, can only handle a certain amount of volume. If
there is no such inherent limitation, and yet the ultimate access to
tokens beyond just the initial ICO is limited, then one may conclude
that decision as a strategy to create that inflated supply and
demand.92 This is not inherently negative; it is simply an action that
should be taken into consideration when using the Howey test to
determine whether the issuers intended to create an expectation of
profit.
Consider a limited-edition watch released in high demand. The
watch could be used exactly for what it was made for, to tell time,
but many individuals would likely purchase it with the intent to hold
it as an investment that will increase in value. If the same watch was
mass-manufactured, the potential value is unlikely to be as high, and
there would be more purchasers intending to use it simply to wear
and tell time.
The creators of Munchee Inc., and in turn MUN tokens, planned
to use this supply and demand theory in practice.93 Munchee Inc. is
an app-based company that focuses on restaurant reviews.94 The
original function was to allow users to post reviews and photos of
their meals.95 Once Munchee decided to develop the app further, it
decided to raise the funds with an ICO.96 Ultimately, the SEC issued
a cease and desist order against the company’s ICO of MUN tokens
stating that they were a security and thus needed to comply with the
relevant securities laws.97
One of the many factors the SEC took into consideration in its
decision to classify MUN tokens as a security was the company’s
plan to increase the value of the token.98 The whitepaper that
Munchee issued described several different actions the company
91
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would take to increase the value of MUN tokens to benefit holders.
One of those ideas included limiting circulation.99 The company
planned to “burn” tokens (take them out of circulation) periodically
after receiving them as payment for certain actions, thereby
restricting the number in use.100 Munchee claimed that this “could
potentially increase the appreciation of the remaining MUN tokens
as the total supply in circulation reduces and as users would prefer
holding their MUN tokens.”101
2. Utility Coins as Memberships and the Secondary Market
The Munchee promotional materials also discussed the plan to
give access to a secondary exchange to allow the holders of MUN
to partake in a market for the tokens.102 The value of utility tokens to
the investors, beyond the use of the product alone, comes from the
gain that they can realize by resale of the token on a secondary
exchange.103 This adds an element that would not ordinarily be
present in a traditional product being purchased for use.104 Utility
tokens that are used to access a specific site or event may be
comparable to a membership in a traditional sense.105 However, even
if investors do plan to use the token and the rights associated with
99
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them, in most situations, there is still an expectation of profit beyond
a pure membership or purchase of a product.106 As FINMA
explained in its guidelines, even if the token is purchased with an
intent to use it for its utility, if there is still an expectation or intent
to obtain a profit, then they should be considered a security token.107
These secondary markets bring opportunities into play that may
not otherwise exist. The SEC has issued information about the
difference in pricing between the IPO price paid by initial investors
and the price that was paid on the secondary market once the shares
were resold:
[t]here can be a large difference between the price of shares when
purchased in an initial public offering (IPO) and the price for the same
shares when they start trading in the secondary market (where previously
issued stocks, bonds, and other securities are bought and sold) after the
IPO.
The pricing disparities occur most often when an IPO is “hot” or appeals
to many investors. When an IPO is “hot,” the demand for the securities
far exceeds the supply of shares. The excess demand can only be
completely satisfied once trading in the IPO shares begins. This
imbalance between supply and demand generally causes the price of
each share to rise dramatically in the first hours or days of trading. The
price often falls after this initial flurry of trading subsides. 108

This economic observation also ties in the scarcity of the product
and the impact it has on pricing, as discussed in the previous section.
There may also be some risk associated with the investment
beyond what would come from the purchase of a standard, already
operational membership. For example, as seen in a representative
case, the Supreme Court of California determined that purchasing
memberships to a country club before it was built, with the
developers relying on the funding from the membership purchases
106
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(last modified Sept. 6, 2011).
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to continue construction, constituted a security because of the risk
of the ultimate product not materializing.109 The Court decided that
the memberships were investment contracts because there was a risk
of the country club never taking form, even though the ultimate
benefit was just the use of the facilities.110 Although the Court used
a state test called the risk capital test—discussed further below—its
goal of investor protection is in the same spirit as the Howey test.111
Because ICOs, without a fully functional product at the time of the
offering, carry this same risk, regulation is needed in order to protect
investors.112
Beyond this initial stage, once the country club is up and
running, memberships can be purchased without that initial risk
(setting aside the always-present possibility of the club going out of
business). These types of memberships are not considered securities,
so what is different about purchasing a token that allows the holder
to have a similar type of “membership” or utility?113 The difference
in many of these cases is that unlike memberships, the tokens are
often liquid and sellable on a secondary exchange, potentially for a
return on the initial investment.114 Many of the ICOs have tokens
that can be transferred between parties, leading to an increased
expectation of profit and making them look more like securities.115
Weighing all of these considerations, the expectations of profits
prong is likely satisfied for most ICOs. Therefore, if the final Howey
109
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factor discussed next is also satisfied, the ICO at issue will be
considered a security.
B. From the Efforts of Others
In response to the uncertainties surrounding the classification of
ICO tokens, the Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT)
Project was created with a goal of providing a framework that an
ICO could apply and conform to in order to ensure compliance with
any securities laws.116 This is purportedly achieved by first using a
contract between the developers and the accredited investors, which
the creators of SAFT concededly designate as a security that
requires compliance with securities laws.117 The creators of SAFT
next determined that once the product is fully developed, the
resulting functional utility tokens will not fall under the securities
definition and therefore would not need to follow federal securities
laws.118 This conclusion was reached by looking at the “solely from
the efforts of others” prong in the Howey test.119 The idea is that once
a token becomes functional, its success and profits no longer rely on
the efforts of others, but rather are predominantly influenced by
market forces outside of any individual’s control.120
The Cardozo Blockchain Project’s analysis of SAFT concluded
that the suggested framework could have undesired implications.121
The Blockchain Project states that the framework could
unnecessarily bring some pre-functionality tokens into the SEC
purview, and could also keep tokens that should be securities, even
though functional, improperly outside of regulations.122 Using this
SAFT framework simplifies a complex issue, but potentially at the
expense of accuracy.123
The creators of the SAFT whitepaper believe that periodic
updating of the already functional product is not sufficient to satisfy
116
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the “from the efforts of others” prong.124 Even if that conclusion is
accepted, the token value can still be derived from the efforts of
others by looking at the exchanges they may be traded on. 125 The
tokens may even derive much of their value from the functioning of
this exchange,126 as will be evaluated below. This conclusion as to
the value the exchange provides has been addressed in the SAFT
whitepaper.127 The authors explain “[w]hen a token purchaser resells
a token on an exchange platform for more than the purchase price,
it is not the exchange platform that created the price difference. To
the contrary, the market is merely the venue where the token
purchaser executes the sale.”128 The whitepaper also cites cases
determining that forward contracts from gold and silver did not meet
the Howey test requirements “because profits to the coin buyer
depended primarily upon the fluctuations of the gold market, not the
managerial efforts of others.”129 However valid these points may be,
they do not adequately weigh the necessary influence of functioning
markets in maintaining the value of something like a digital token.130
In most cases, the markets are an essential tool in allowing the
profits to be realized.131
Some commentators debate that gold and silver are different
than tokens in that there is inherent value in these commodities,
whereas a token is simply intangible code.132 An alternative
conclusion is that it is the willingness and ability of others to give
value in exchange for the precious metals that gives them their
124
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worth.133 The same can be said about digital tokens. Without an
exchange platform to trade these tokens on, the value would be
linked and limited to the effort that individuals would have to put
into finding direct buyers.134 This would severely hinder the
feasibility of having free exchanges that properly reflect market
value, and, in turn, profits could suffer.135 Hence, the managerial
efforts of others in keeping the exchange running smoothly in order
to facilitate the buying and selling of tokens is essential to creating
profits,136 and if a token can be traded on an exchange, it would likely
meet this fourth and final “from the efforts of others” aspect of the
Howey test.
C. The Risk Capital Test
As discussed earlier, in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, the
Supreme Court of California applied the risk capital test in
determining whether solicitations for purchases of a country club
membership, before the country club was built, and of which the
capital would be used to build the club, constituted a security
offering.137 The court decided that the memberships did constitute a
security under the risk capital test because the:
[p]etitioners [were] soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a
business for profit. The purchaser’s risk is not lessened merely because
the interest he purchases is labelled a membership. Only because he risks
his capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that the
benefits of club membership will materialize.138

Frequently, ICOs seek capital from investors in order to build
their product.139 Often, the investors are taking a risk in hopes that
133
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the product will ultimately succeed, without a guarantee of
recovering their investment.140 It is likely that under both the risk
capital test and the Howey test, this would constitute a security.
Securities laws were enacted to protect investors, and a transaction
such as a country club membership is a prime example of a situation
that should require disclosures.141 This allows investors to make an
informed decision about whether or not to participate in a particular
investment opportunity.142 Even though their ultimate “profit” may
not be monetary, they are still risking their capital with the
expectation of an ultimate material benefit, in this case a
membership at a constructed and functioning club.143 Currently, the
risk capital test is most commonly used by state courts,144 but
perhaps it would be a valuable tool for the SEC to use in determining
whether a particular ICO is posing a risk to investors and thus,
whether the ICO is likely to fall under one of the regulatory schemes.
The Cardozo Blockchain Project has addressed the risk capital
test in its response to the SAFT Project whitepaper.145 The authors
explain how applying an analysis of the underlying risk of failure of
a budding company or product would implicate scenarios beyond
what securities laws are designed to regulate, using as examples
The Risk Capital Test – List of States, SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES LAW
CENTER, http://www.theselc.org/which_states_apply_the_risk_capital_test_when
_deciding_what_is_a_security (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) (summarizing Silver
Hills, the test says that “[t]he court found that the investors were risking their
capital in expectation of receiving the benefits of club membership, which was in
the control of the issuers of the membership. Notably, the court stated the ‘act
extends even to transactions where capital is placed without expectation of any
material benefits.’”); see also TEZOS, supra note 44.
141
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Representing a Start-Up Company, 56 ARK. L. REV. 773, 830 (2004) (“The
Securities Act has two basic objectives: (1) to provide investors with material
information concerning securities offered for sale to the public and (2) to prohibit
misrepresentation, deceit, and other fraudulent acts and unfair practices in the sale
of securities generally, whether or not the securities are required to be
registered.”); Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1.
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crowdfunding for the creation of a new product or the preorder of a
Tesla car.146 What their response briefly mentions is how the risk
capital test is not determinative, but rather only a factor taken into
consideration when looking at the facts and circumstances. 147 The
application of the risk capital test as a supporting factor instead of a
determinative element helps abate their concern of too much
inclusivity. The Project is concerned with a potential application of
the risk capital test on its own.148 However, it may be a useful
consideration for the SEC in addition to the full application and
analysis of the Howey test. Any use of the risk capital test should be
another supplemental factor beyond the four Howey factors, as it is
too broad of a test to apply individually.
IV. HOW THE SEC HAS ADDRESSED ICOS
Any tokens that do meet the four Howey test requirements are
likely to be considered securities by federal regulators.149 However,
few decisions applying the Howey test exist, making it difficult to
predict which factors are most determinative.150 The SEC has
recently issued public statements and investigative reports intended
to make this analysis more transparent.151 One of the first
investigations from the SEC into The DAO led the SEC to publish
a report that they hoped would give guidance and considerations for
future issuers.152 This insight provides a valuable look into the SEC’s
application of the Howey test; however, this one scenario is unlikely
to provide enough for uniform application to other unique offerings.
Until more factors are discussed by the SEC, there may be issuers
without an example of an adequately parallel comparison to their
own product.
146
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This lack of a bright line standard as to what type of token
requires SEC registration is likely to leave many issuers
uncomfortable. The registration requirements are burdensome,
costly, and time intensive.153 Issuers would prefer to avoid having
additional obligations resulting from their ICO falling within the
scope of the federal securities laws.154 However, avoidance of the
registration requirements is likely to trigger SEC compliance
actions.155 The issuers need to weigh the cost of compliance with the
chance that the SEC may decide that their ICO is outside of their
purview. The issuers may take their chances and not register their
ICO to save time and money.156 However, if the gamble does not pay
off it could end up costing them much more.157 For example, in an
emergency action against a fraudulent ICO touting the promise of
exceptional profits:
[t]he SEC’s complaint charge[d] [the issuers and others involved in the
offering] with violating the anti-fraud provisions, and . . . the registration
provision, of the U.S. federal securities laws. The complaint s[ought]
permanent injunctions, disgorgement plus interest and penalties. [T]he
SEC also s[ought] an officer-and-director bar and a bar from offering
digital securities . . . .”158

Despite the difficulties the test may present in token offerings
with ambiguous characteristics, the subjective Howey test is still the
appropriate analysis to apply due to the wide variety and functions
of these tokens.159 A new bright-line test is unlikely to account for
the multitude of differences among the tokens, particularly because
there will always be exceptions to a rigid rule due to the wide variety
153
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and functions of the tokens. Despite this, there have been, and will
continue to be, attempts to create a test that issuers can use to help
alleviate some of the uncertainty.160 There may be some applicable
suggestions that result from this continued refining process;
however, it seems unlikely that courts will create a more objective
test that maintains the flexibility and personalization provided by the
Howey approach.161 The flexibility the Howey factors offer is
imperative for these fluid and unique offerings.
Developers may have a sense of whether their offering
constitutes a security.162 Nonetheless, they could be trying to use this
industry uncertainty to claim that they did not realize that it would
be considered as such, thus explaining why they did not register.163
Importantly, just because something is called a security does not
mean that it is, and vice versa, despite what the issuers may claim.164
The SEC will look beyond the issuer’s decision regarding whether
or not their token is a security to instead define the “economic
reality.”165 The economic reality is what the underlying function and
properties of the product resemble when compared to other devices,
such as how it is similar to stock, and not just what it purports to be
by label.166 Despite SAFTs best intentions, the Howey test will likely
still need to be applied in order to determine whether an ICO’s
designation is correct.
For instance, in a cease and desist order against Munchee Inc.,
the SEC worked through the Howey test to demonstrate that the
160
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161
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tokens were a security, even though Munchee claimed that they had
run through the test themselves and determined the tokens were
not.167 The expectation of profit test was clearly met, with the SEC
issuing a press release stating that:
[a]ccording to the [SEC’s cease and desist] order, in the course of the
offering, [Munchee Inc.] and other promoters emphasized that investors
could expect that efforts by the company and others would lead to an
increase in value of the tokens. The company also emphasized it would
take steps to create and support a secondary market for the tokens.
Because of these and other company activities, investors would have had
a reasonable belief that their investment in tokens could generate a return
on their investment.168

These actions easily fit within the Howey framework, which is
likely why the SEC took the stance that the ICO was a securities
offering and ordered the company to return the funds to the 40
investors it had gathered, notably within the first couple hours of the
offering.169
Moreover, in the order, the SEC explained that
[e]ven if MUN tokens had a practical use at the time of the offering, it
would not preclude the token from being a security. Determining
whether a transaction involves a security does not turn on labelling . . .
but instead requires an assessment of “the economic realities underlying
a transaction.”170

The recently issued FINMA guidelines parallel some reflections
of the SECs statements on ICOs.171 The guidelines mention the need
to take a flexible approach that looks at ICOs on a case-by-case
basis.172 Like the SEC, FINMA states that “[it] will base its
assessment on the underlying economic purpose of an ICO, most
particularly when there are indications of an attempt to circumvent
existing regulations.”173
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V. CONCLUSION
The SEC has its hands full as the number of ICOs continues to
rise.174 With the community of developers and issuers wanting clear
guidelines and investors wanting assurance that the tokens they are
contributing to are following applicable laws, there may be
increased pressure to come up with bright-line tests. Unfortunately,
with the crackdown just beginning, courts have had insufficient time
to issue enough opinions to provide a template for the parties
involved.175 The SEC has repeatedly said that they are going to look
at each ICO on a case-by-case basis, and that is likely the best
answer at the moment.176 This wave of innovation needs a flexible
approach, and at the same time needs a tough analysis to protect
investors and the public from fraudulent or overly risky (at least
without the known risks) offerings.177 The proposed frameworks
have their merits, but they would also likely create issues that
otherwise would not exist with subjective examination.178
With regulators discussing the need to create regulations
specifically to address ICOs, this is an opportune time to cement the
basic analysis of the Howey test as the universal test in ICO
inquiries.179 Though this initially would seem to create an
insurmountable issue of scope for concerned issuers hoping for clear
guidelines, this should not be a deterrent from having a factor-based
regulation. Guidance will continue to be issued over time, and once
the prominent players such as the federal regulators and courts are
on board, the industry should begin to settle. Though the Howey
factors will be applied in the same manner in each instance, the
multitude of token characteristics should eventually be analyzed and
weighed as to whether they classify the token as a security or not.
This will provide valuable insight to new developers as they are
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considering how the SEC will weigh their tokens’ qualities.180 For
the tokens that have unique characteristics that have not yet been
addressed, the flexible framework will become a valuable tool
instead of a hindrance.
There needs to be a balance of efficiency and accuracy, and the
Howey test has proven capable thus far of accomplishing both. Once
additional case law and decisions by the SEC are released, the
ambiguity concerns should be relieved. For now, the developers
need to take an honest look at the token to decide whether it could
rationally be seen as a security, as that will be the side that the SEC’s
decisions will err on moving forward.181
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